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Abstract:  
Concern about the gendered nature of fear of crime (and in particular of sex crime), and the 
spatialisation of fear of crime discourses have preoccupied feminist activists, criminologists 
and other social scientists for at least the past quarter century. This chapter examines how 
it is, despite the fact that women have been speaking out against acts of sexual aggression 
in public space for decades, we continue to live in a context which promotes spatialized 
violence against women through fear of crime discourses. Interrogating how rape culture is 
produced by (and it turn produces) rape myths, which produce fear of crime, this chapter 
deconstructs some of the ways in which rape myths are perpetuated. It advances, following 
Deleuze and Guattari, how war machines might work to break a rape culture, or at least 
begin this work. This chapter emphasises why it is imperative that we continue to speak 
about, and act against, rape culture in contemporary criminological discourses. 
 
Rape culture and women’s fear of crime in public spaces are mutually constituted. In 
1991, Elizabeth Wilson described how women live out their lives ‘on sufferance’ in the 
metropolis: ‘to be a woman – an individual, not part of a family or a kin group – in the 
city’, she argued, ‘is to become…a public woman’, is to be out of place. Being a public 
woman, belonging to nobody, the woman in public space is a problem. From this 
relationship between gender and belonging in public space, emerges fear of crime. The 
proliferation of rape culture reminds women that this is the case. Women’s fear of crime 
has been described as the spatial expression of patriarchy (Valentine, 1989), through 
which women are perpetually warned of their vulnerability (Stanko, 1993: 128). In the 
context of women’s experiences of sexual harassment, we know that ‘public order 
sustains, iterates, and constantly reiterates gender as a fundamental division of society’ 
(Gardner, 1995: 40) and that this ‘works as part of a larger strategy of social control 
though ‘sexual terrorism’’ (Kissling, 1991: 455).   
Concern about the gendered nature of fear of crime (and in particular of sex crime), and 
the spatialisation of fear of crime discourses have preoccupied feminist activists, 
criminologists and other social scientists for at least the past quarter century. Calls to 
engage with women’s experiences emerge in these early discussions of women’s fear of 
crime in public spaces; to consider their exclusion from public spaces such as streets, 
carparks, green spaces, public transport, shopping malls, bars and nightclubs; to take 
seriously the low-level sexualised harassment that women experience in these spaces; to 
attend to the significance that intersectionality has on women’s experiences of gendered 
social injustice and the criminal justice system, (Kissling, 1991; Stanko, 1993, 1995, 1996;  
Gardner, 1990, 1995; Pain, 1991, 2000; Koskela, 1997; Gilchrist et al, 1998). These 
demands – these rigorous criticisms of existing policy approaches to dealing with fear of 
crime – highlight the prevalence of an important social problem: spatial injustice and the 
promotion of rape culture, or, put differently, the promotion of a culture that condones 
the practice of violence against women. This chapter examines how it is, despite the fact 
that women have been speaking out against acts of sexual aggression in public space for 
decades, we1 continue to live in a context which promotes spatialized violence against 
women through fear of crime discourses. I consider the role of spatial justice in this 
context, and examine why, rather than waning as a result of the work of these early 
feminist interventions, contemporary rape culture is thriving.  
One of the ways in which rape culture is able to thrive is through the production and 
reproduction of gendered fear of crime. This works through the mobilisation of certain 
rape myths. In this chapter I consider the composition of rape culture in the context of 
fear of crime and rape myths (how does a rape myth work? What does it do? How do you 
make a rape myth?). Focussing on the figure of the stranger-rapist, I examine the role that 
myth plays in the construction of rape culture and fear of crime. I argue that rape myths 
are part of the State2 apparatus of control and regulation, and, drawing from the work of 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, I consider how the molecularity of myths might have 
transformative affordances. I explore how machinic thought, politics and practice might 
undo gendered spatial injustice and rape culture more broadly by creating ‘war 
machines’. This advances criminological understandings of fear of crime by 
complexifying the ways in which we think about gender, public space and safety and fear 
in contemporary debates (Walklate and Mythen, 2008). But first, in order to illustrate 
how, despite over 25 years of activism in this field, the observations made by early fear 
of crime scholars remains as pertinent as ever, I turn to consider one of the ways in which 
rape culture is able to thrive. 
Rape culture can be understood as a socio-cultural ethic or practice which normalizes 
sexual violence (usually) against women. From a Deleuzo-Guattarian (2004a [1972]), 
2004b [1980]) perspective, it is possible to suggest that rape culture is part of the 
apparatus of the State. Rape culture works in a number of ways to stabilize perceived 
hierarchies of gender inequality between men and women. It is rape culture that both 
produces and is produced by discourses which constitutes fear of crime and constructs 
the female3 body as a problem in public space (Wilson, 1991).   
Rape culture is also sustained in the popular imaginary through arguments which defend 
‘page 3’ 4 in the UK, for instance, the over-representation of female victims of sex crimes 
in media news reporting, stand-up comedians’ sexist jokes, and so on. It is sustained in 
the criminal justice imaginary, and in public policy, through the construction of sex 
crimes as inherently different to other forms of crimes against the person, through 
discourses which place women as inherently more vulnerable public space-users than 
men, and through actuarial approaches to criminal justice which place greater 
responsibility on women (as potential victims) for preventing sexual violence than men 
(as potential offenders). As has been demonstrated elsewhere (Stanko 1993, Brooks, 
2011, Fanghanel, 2013, Olney, 2015), it is rape culture that sustains the pervasiveness of 
safety advice offered to women which promotes self-policing, for instance, or which 
sustains victim-blaming discourses and that situate the responsibility to avoid rape and 
sexual assault in public spaces on women themselves. Let us examine how this works in 
practice.  
How does rape culture work? 
In 2014, the Rape Abuse and Incest National Network (RAINN) in the United States (US) 
participated in a consultation with the White House’s Office on Violence Against Women’s 
Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault. In it, RAINN suggest that the 
‘unfortunate trend towards blaming ‘rape culture’ for…sexual violence’ distracts current 
anti-rape activist campaigns by obscuring the fact that it is ‘a minority of individuals’, not 
cultures, who rape.  In their letter, RAINN – an organisation which works to prevent 
sexual violence – posit that rapists, rather like ‘bad apples’, are individuals who choose to 
rape, rather than a product of culture more broadly:  
More than 90% of college-age males do not, and are unlikely to ever rape. In fact, 
we have found that they’re ready and eager to be engaged on these issues. It’s the 
other guys (and, sometimes, women) who are the problem.  (RAINN, 2014, no page 
no., emphasis added). 
So, can there really be no such thing as rape culture? The notion and category of ‘culture’ 
is deeply contested (Gilroy, 1993). A laden term, ‘culture’ originates from the Latin 
‘cultura’ meaning to tend or cultivate agriculture. Culture can be understood as 
something that is produced, nurtured, raised, as something which can be consumed, and 
which can prosper and wither. When we say that something is ‘cultural’ we mean that is 
has specific resonance within a specific spatio-temporal context and that it may not have 
the same meaning outside of that context. Invoking ‘culture’ to account for violence for 
‘bad behaviour’ such as rape, is a double-edged sword.  
The debates surrounding Susan Moller Okin’s (1999) controversial essay on feminism 
and multiculturalism demonstrate this (see Honig 1999). Leti Volpp (2000), in an 
approach that I argue proves fruitful for understanding the current case, contrasts two 
instances of child marriage – another form of gender violence – in the US (one between 
US nationals in Maryland and another between two Mexican nationals living illegally  in 
Texas). Discourses surrounding the former marriage condemned the union of a twenty-
nine year old man to his thirteen year old bride as a case of individual ‘perversion’ and 
‘lack of responsibility’. Discourses surrounding the latter marriage between a fourteen 
year old female and a twenty-two year old male, attributed it to the ‘Mexican culture’ 
which normalises the precocious sexuality of young Mexican women (Volpp, 2000: 92-
97).  Both accounts, argues Volpp, enable broader US society to ignore its own taken-for-
granted culture. On the one hand, by demonising one marriage as an individual pathology, 
public discourses are able to absolve themselves of the possibility that there is something 
inherent about US culture which enables child marriage to occur, whilst on the other 
hand, demonising the latter marriage as the product of an ‘other’ culture, the broader US 
public is absolved of any anxiety about its own culture. 
Suggesting that culture causes sexual violence is certainly a far from straightforward 
proposition. It is this complexity that I recognise RAINN might be trying to capture in 
their White House recommendations. Yet, RAINN’s comments mark one of series of 
developments in contemporary attitudes to rape and sexual assault prevention which 
shift attention away from the social and systemic factors which promote a culture that 
permits and enables sexual violence, towards one which reduces the culpability and the 
responsibility for preventing such attacks to the individual. I am interested in what 
happens when this occurs. Let us begin by examining the implications of RAINN’s claims 
about rape culture. To return to their original argument: 
Rape is not caused by cultural factors but by the conscious decisions, of a small 
percentage of the community, to commit a violent crime. 
While that may seem an obvious point, it has tended to get lost in recent debates. 
This has led to an inclination to focus on particular segments of the student 
population (e.g. athletes), particular aspects of campus culture (e.g. the Greek 
system5), or traits that are common in many millions of law-abiding Americans 
(e.g. masculinity) rather than on the sub-population at fault; those who commit 
rape (RAINN, 2014, no page no.). 
This, they argue, absolves the individual perpetrator of blame, by allowing him/her to 
make a ‘my culture made me do it’ argument (Honig, 1999). By suggesting that it is not 
culture, but rather individual perversion which makes people commit sexual violence, 
RAINN argue that we get closer the possibility of reducing and preventing sexual assaults.  
Their argument has at least three implications. Firstly, RAINN appear to be eliding the 
term ‘rape culture’ with the concept of ‘cultures who rape’.  Stereotypes about athletes or 
fraternities reify a construction of masculinity which is ‘macho’, elitist, aggressive, 
hierarchical, highly physicalized and aligned with sexual violence. Clearly, to suggest that 
fraternities have a culture of sexual violence or that all athletes are (potential if not 
actual) rapists is as simplistic as it is offensive (Humphrey and Khan, 2000, see also 
Messerschmidt, 1993). It is also not what is meant by ‘rape culture’. These groups, whom 
RAINN identify as the target of sexual violence prevention education programmes, might 
be insulted and unmoved by such attention. Fraternities and sports teams may have 
‘cultures’ of their own but these are not inherent to, nor outside of, ‘rape culture’ more 
broadly. Indeed, the very notion that these groups might stereotypically be thought of as 
rapists in the first place relies on reference to discourses of masculinity that are imbued 
with, and constituted through, a broader culture in which sexual violence is permissible.   
Secondly, we can analyse the implications of this project of individualising blame by 
comparing this extract to Volpp’s (2000) discussion of child marriage. By pathologising 
men (and women) who commit sexual assault as errant malevolents we erase the 
specificity of the cultural context in which their sexual violence is enabled in the first 
place. Not all acts of sexual violence are acts of rape. Sexual violence encompasses less 
obvious forms of aggression such as ‘slut-shaming’, sexual harassment, cat-calling, 
flashing, acts of physical molestation, latent threats, stalking, coercive sex, to name only 
a few. These acts of ‘everyday’ aggressions constitute and are constituted by a culture in 
which sexual violence is able to happen (see Kissing, 1991; Gardner, 1995; Stanko, 1993, 
1995). Thirdly, divorcing the individual aggressor from the culture in which she or he 
aggresses is an exercise in the erasure of very conditions in which sexuality and proper 
subjects are produced and policed through State apparatus. As Volpp’s (2000) argument 
suggests, if we are blind to the tyranny of our own culture, we are blind the possibilities 
of challenging this tyranny.  
Ultimately, individualising blame obliterates the socio-cultural constructions that make 
sexual violence possible in the first place. Consider this in the context of hate crime; 
Barbara Perry (2001) argues that these occur not simply because perpetrators of hate 
crimes enjoy committing those offences, nor because they feel envious of the object of 
their hate, nor because they feel disenfranchised from their community (usually the 
opposite, in fact), but because hate crimes enable a certain performance of the self, within 
the context of a culture which the perpetrator believes is at least indifferent to their 
crime, if not actually in support of it. For Perry, hate crimes occur because the socio-
cultural context in which they happen actively facilitates them thorough structural 
injustices such as institutional racism, misogyny, disablism or homophobia which are 
enshrined at all levels of the State and within the fabric of social life. Arguably, rape 
culture is part of this. It fosters the construction and deployment of the ‘proper objects’ 
of hate and derision, of proper victims, of proper perpetrators and of the proper spatio-
temporal context for this to emerge (the street corner, the empty car park, the unlit 
under-pass).  Contemporary criminological thinking about gendered fear of crime and 
public space needs to attend to this relationship between normative approaches to fear 
of crime, sexual violence and the context in which it is able to occur. Neglecting the 
interplay between these elements in the way that RAINN suggests is one of the ways in 
which rape culture is able to thrive.  
To argue that sexual violence occurs because of rape culture does not provide an apology 
for perpetrators of sexual violence. Likewise, suggesting that there are specific cultures 
that produce those more likely to rape than others is a corruption of what the term ‘rape 
culture’ is. Certainly, male and female perpetrators of sexual violence cannot claim ‘my 
culture made me do it’, but equally, the battle against sexual violence and its relationship 
with fear of crime cannot obfuscate the context in which perpetrators might believe that 
they might get away with it/ that it was probably ok/that ‘no’ does not always mean ‘no’ 
(O’Byrne et al, 2008). Instead, claims which erase the existence rape culture enable sexual 
violence to breed unchecked as they do not permit interrogation of the territory upon 
which sexual violence might emerge as a possibility for a perpetrator in the first place. 
How do you make a rape culture? 
Part of the way in which fear of crime and rape culture works is through the expression 
of rape myths. Myths, from the Greek muthos meaning a story delivered by word of 
mouth, are, according to Lévi-Strauss (1955), common to all societies and underlie all 
cultural activities. Myths are defined both as allegories to explain social phenomena and 
widely held, but false, beliefs. These definitions are instructive in the context of rape 
culture. 
The importance of story-telling and myth-making about public space is well-recognised 
in fear of crime studies (Lupton, 1999). The role of false belief too, saturates rape myths 
and rape culture. Myths concern events which happened ‘long ago’ or in an ‘everlasting 
present’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1955: 430), the atemporality of which makes them excessive to 
the event in which they emerge. In the context of rape myths, for instance, the sluttily 
dressed woman-as-likely-prey, the high-heeled girl-as-ideal-victim, the unescorted 
woman-as-provocative, are ubiquitous images that become synecdoches for sexual 
assault and rape within rape culture (Brownmiller, 1975, Stanko, 1995, Gardner, 1995, 
Friedman and Valenti, 2008). Myths also, importantly, work to create knowledges about 
places that are fearsome and places that are safe. Lupton’s (1999) research has 
demonstrated that myths about places which are apparently fearsome are often based on 
constructions of marginalised social ‘Others’, cast as deviants to be avoided. As I have 
argued elsewhere (Fanghanel, 2014), the work that this sort of Othering does in order to 
diminish fear of crime ends up promoting the very fear of crime that it purportedly tries 
to combat. 
For Deleuze and Guattari (2004a [1972], 2004b [1980]) myths are ideological, and only 
become productive (only do something) when they are brought into connection with 
what they call ‘real social production’. That is, myth are representational (in a state of 
Being), but in themselves, are not productive outside of social relations. The myth of the 
stranger-rapist, for instance, works to produce fear of crime in a social context in which 
public spaces are constructed as sites of exclusion for certain bodies, in favour of others, 
where women do not belong, where potential sexual violence is latent and ubiquitous. 
Yet, myths such as these pose problems for Deleuze and Guattari who posit that ‘there is 
no life for us in the myth. Only myth lives in the myth’ (2004a [1972]: 388). A myth, in 
this form, is molar. Molarity describes a static state of ‘making-the-same’. A mole, for 
Deleuze and Guattari is a unified whole – a myth, alone, can only be a myth – and is in an 
ossified state of Being, not of Becoming-6. The act and practice of Becoming- is 
foundational to Deleuze and Guattari’s politics. It is in the flow, the indeterminacy, the 
immanence, the potentiality of Becoming- that something is possible. Becoming- is a 
process of change, it is the way in which systems of thought, practices, State politics, 
selves, might deterritorialise (and reterritorialize) and transform contemporary life.  In 
the present case, I suggest it is precisely in the potentiality of the Becoming-, of the 
molecular (as opposed to the molar), that contemporary rape culture and fear of crime 
might be transformed.  
This molecularity can be understood by reading Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist account of 
how myths work in conjunction with Deleuze’s (2004) critique of his work, through the 
concept of machinic assemblages. Whereas for Lévi-Strauss, myths acquire meaning 
through their structure, for Deleuze and Guattari, the particular connection a myth has 
with other bodies within a machine is only one of innumerable ways in which a myth 
might become meaningful, or indeed, might become a myth in the first place. Contra Lévi-
Strauss’s assertions about the structure and the workings of the myth, Deleuze and 
Guattari (2004b [1980]: 262) argue that myths viewed through a structuralist lens are an 
anathema to the potentiality of Becoming-; myths are the true State order. Becoming- 
(Becoming-animal, Becoming-minortarian, Becoming-woman) deviates from this true 
order. Even Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of myths of becoming animal, for instance, are 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, merely describing blocks of Becoming-. They are not 
Becoming-animals whose potentiality might be transformative, who deterritorialise State 
apparatus and power. The blocks are too fragmented to offer lines of flight; the structure 
too serial to imply different forms of Becoming-.  
The potential to transform social life – rape culture – lies in the potentiality of Becoming-
. A myth is molar: crystallised, ossified, it has become a tool of the State apparatus. What 
is needed is a focus on the molecular: those component parts or bodies which compose 
the moles, which compose the myths, which work in conjunction with other bodies which 
produce rape culture, within a machinic assemblage.   
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a ‘machine’, a word which has its 
etymological origins in Greek, Latin and Proto-Indo European languages stems from 
‘maghana’, which means ‘that which enables/ to have power’.  As Buchanan (1997: 83) 
suggests, machines ‘are always purposeful’; they ‘must be able to do something’. 
Understood thusly, for Deleuze & Guattari, machines are potent and dynamic answers to 
particular problems: the problem of the female body in public space, for instance. The 
bodies which compose the machine have no a priori function, meaning, intrinsic value or 
ethic in themselves, but acquire meaning, or function, through relation, flow – assemblage 
– with other desiring, producing machines.  
Within the myth of the stranger-rapist, the assemblage of the female body, the 
unaccompanied body, the young body, notions of modesty, cultural values of sexual 
desire, the night time, the street, the menacing body, the dark figure of the Other and so 
on, connect to constitute the myth that women are at risk from unknown strangers in 
public space. For Deleuze and Guattari (2004a [1972], 2004b [1980]) it will be by 
examining how a myth works that the ordering and organising capacitates will become 
apparent (within which machinic context? Producing which affects?). How 'meaning' 
works, therefore, alters according to how these flows are organised within historically 
and geographically-specific machines, and the affects they produce.    
Who is the stranger-rapist? 
Let us return to consider the importance of the ‘other guy’ within the stranger-rapist 
myth, evoked by RAINN. Research has variously demonstrated how the myth that women 
risk being raped by strangers on street corners saturates contemporary attitudes to 
preventing fear of crime and promoting safety in public spaces (Pain 1991, Stanko 1996, 
Lupton, 1999; Brooks, 2008). I have variously described how rapists are, in popular 
discourses, referred to as ‘fucking nutters’, ‘arseholes’, ‘lunatics’, ‘weirdos’ how they are 
contrasted with ‘known’ men who ‘have the brains’ not to rape women in public spaces 
(Fanghanel, 2013, 2015; Fanghanel and Lim, 2016;  Lim and Fanghanel, 2016).  What does 
it mean to say that rapist are ‘arseholes’ or simply to say that they are ‘other guys’? And 
what are we able to do with this notion of ‘unpredictable stranger’ danger (Lupton, 1999; 
Pain, 2000)? What composes this mythic creature?  
The myth of the stranger-rapist who lies in wait to ambush unsuspecting women in dark 
alleys or from behind a bush is an important component of rape myths more broadly. 
Even though we know that women are more likely to be sexually assault by a known 
offender (Stanko, 1993), perhaps with whom they live, perhaps to whom they are related, 
than by the mythic figure of the stranger-rapist, his image is, nonetheless, pervasive in 
the way that women are encouraged to deal with the risks discursively posed by their 
bodies in public spaces and to account for their fear of crime. The body of the stranger-
rapist myth exists in conjunction with the myth of the ideal victim, with the construction 
of darkness and strangeness as fearsome, with the public space of the street as a site of 
fear.   
The stranger-rapist, we know, as RAINN tells us, is errant individual. Unrepresentative of 
his group, the stranger-rapist is on the periphery, he is not like us, he is ‘Other’. If we 
consider the boundary between self and other in the context of fear of crime, the tensions 
between fear, safety and how public spaces are ordered emerges. Boundary erection is 
usually (though not exclusively) an exercise of dominant power over a marginalised other 
(Sibley, 1995; see Low, 2008; Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002). In the context of the stranger-
rapist, casting this figure to the margin whilst simultaneously holding that he might be 
everywhere is what makes this myth so persuasive.    
This myth supposes that the figure of the stranger-rapist is everywhere and yet he 
belongs to no-one: he is not my brother, my neighbour, my friend or my ex. He is one of 
those ‘other guys’; that arsehole ‘out there’. He is, figuratively, actually, strange.  He is 
endlessly Other to our Selves (Lupton, 1999 Ahmed, 2006). His strangeness, (from the 
Latin extraneus meaning ‘external’ or ‘from without’), figuratively casts him beyond the 
pale7. The stranger-rapist becomes uncommon in this myth, even as fear of him saturates 
all elements of public space. As an abhorrent figure – as an ‘arsehole’, or a ‘weirdo’ or a 
‘fucking nutter’ – we also know three things; that he cannot be reasoned with (because 
he is a weird nutter); he lacks full subjectivity (because he is composed only of an 
arsehole); and is always, already outside the boundary of what can be accepted.  We also 
know that this stranger-rapist is not known to us, and so, paradoxically, might be anyone. 
He is both everyman and no man; a singularity and a multitude. However, though his state 
of exception composes, in part, the body of the stranger-rapist myth, he is by no means 
extraordinary. He may be constructed as ‘Other’ within the myth, but he is very much at 
the centre of the phenomenon of rape myth (see Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b [1980]: 
271); he is part of the State apparatus which composes rape culture. Of course, when we 
speak of multitude, we are speaking of a something that is pure potentiality, but it is also 
organized. Its particular organization affects what it can do, what it Becomes-. What does 
it Become- in the context of this rape myth of the stranger-rape myth? We can suggest 
that it Becomes- an organization of public space, of sanction, of heteronormativity. We 
can suggest that the multitude of the stranger-rapist is thusly organized so as to be a 
figurative, intangible individual-as-multitude, which is what makes him so difficult to 
know, to touch, to affect, to undo.  
Despite their critique of myths as molar and non-Becoming- Deleuze and Guattari do 
conceive of one way in which a myth might contest the State: when myths are Anomalous. 
Writing of mythic creatures in literature, Deleuze and Guattari (2004b [1980]: 268) bring 
their emphasis on the potentialities of Becoming- into a dialogue with the concept of the 
multitude to suggest that within multitude there is always an Anomal, an outstanding 
individual (Melville’s Moby Dick, Kafka’s Josephine) who is always exceptional to the pack 
or band in which s/he runs. Though the Anomal is exceptional, it is not a model, or pure 
specimen of the multiplicity from which it comes.  Instead Anomals represent the 
borderline of the pack, or of the multitude (2004b [1980]: 270-1). The Anomal can occupy 
a number of positions within the multiplicity – it might occupy the centre of power, it 
might be peripheral, it might reflect the shifting boundaries of the band or multitudinous 
pack. The Anomal figure is the conduit through which the transformative capacity of 
Becoming- emerges. According to Negri (2002), the multitude is revolution. It is the 
fullness of life. It is the revolutionary monster that might transform common living 
substance into new forms of life, or ways of Becoming-. New forms of life which, 
composed of singularities, might produce new subjectivities.  
Certainly, in their conceptualisation of the multitude, of its potentiality and its 
relationship to power, Deleuze and Guattari will have imagined this revolutionary 
potential. Yet, it would be misleading to simply state that the multitude in relation to 
Anomal myths and transforming rape culture is ‘good’. Nothing is inherently good or bad, 
nothing about Deleuze and Guattari’s work is necessarily emancipatory or liberatory. 
They suggest themselves that even the exceptional, mythic, Anomal can be ‘undermined 
by forces which establish in them…interior centres of the State type…replacing pack 
affects with State intelligibilities’ Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b [1980]: 271). Though 
exceptional in the multitude, the Anomal figure is not outside the reach of State apparatus 
and is able to manifest State affects, such as the Anomal stranger-rapist, here. Within it, 
is harboured the capacity, or potentiality, for transformation, however. The Anomal of a 
multiplicity – of a rape myth – can leave the centre of the pack of State apparatus. Because 
it is composed molecularly, because of its flows and potentialities, it can – it might – 
connect elsewhere, making different assemblages, and forging new Becomings- and 
subjectivities (becoming-minortarian, for instance, expressing groups which are 
‘oppressed, prohibited in revolt’) (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b [1980]: 272). We can see 
that in the multitude of the stranger-rapist myth there is the power to exclude, to 
marginalise and to persecute forms of life that do not fit; to nurture a rape culture. If the 
stranger-rapist is Anomal in his particularity even as he is excessive – everywhere in his 
multitude – he certainly operates within the State apparatus which constructs public 
spaces as fearsome for women (Wilson, 1991 inter alia), and which enables (and is 
enabled by) a thriving rape culture which normalises violence against women and 
women’s fear of it. 
How do we break a rape culture? 
It is precisely through the violence of State apparatus that rape myths which compose 
rape culture are so convincing. The State triumphs, according to Deleuze and Guattari 
(2004b [1980]: 495), by disavowing its own violence. If the violence of the State 
apparatus is supposed to presuppose itself (if we are told that violence is ‘primal’ or 
‘primitive’ or ‘natural’, if we are told the state only uses violence against violence to keep 
the peace) the violence of the State itself is obliterated. This is what we obliterate when 
we try to deny the existence of rape culture.   
So how might the multitude of the stranger-rape myth be transformed into ‘new forms of 
life’ (Negri, 2002)? What do we need to do to transform rape culture? Deleuze and 
Guattari’s answer would be that we need to make a war machine. A war machine has little 
to do with actual war, but it is an enemy of the State apparatus (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004b [1980]:27). A war machine is explosive. Usually beyond the apparatus of the State, 
the war machine can (and has sometimes been) captured by State to express itself as the 
police, the military or other forms of State violence (because as we have seen, nothing is 
inherently transgressive or transformative), but as a series of flows and dynamisms it is 
able to resist capture through deterritorialisations – undoings, remakings, virtualising – 
of the machine of State apparatus (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b [1980]: 483). For Deleuze 
and Guattari, the war machine offers an alterity to the disciplined, molar strategy of the 
State apparatus of control. They conceive of the warrior as an anarchic counter to the 
disciplined subject. The warrior troubles State apparatus which renders docile and 
‘zombie-like’ its subjects (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b [1980]: 470).  
In the context of the State apparatus of rape culture, composed in part through rape myth, 
the warrior smashes the molar prescription of the stranger-rapist. Through 
deterritorialisation, it harbours the capacity to undo the power that this State apparatus 
holds over subjectivity, over public space, over spatial justice. The molecular of the rape 
myth can be transformed through connection with the metamorphic potentialities of the 
war machine. Through it we might take the Anomal of the stranger-rapist, singular in his 
multitude and render him fully anomalous.   
The destructive capacities of the war machine challenge the effects of State thinking. 
Through this conceptualisation, the transformation of what we currently talk about as 
rape culture and as rape myth Becomes-potential. This way of thinking– of thinking 
machinically – usefully reminds us that because the machine is eventful, it is not an 
essence, its meaning is not pre-determined. Rather, for Deleuze and Guattari (2004b 
[1980]), the machine (here, of rape culture), and the bodies that compose it (rape myths, 
safety advice, public spaces, sexual mores, appropriate femininity etcetera) – bodies 
which are themselves composed of machines – harbours the capacity to change what it 
does, or the way in which it addresses a problem, or the problem which it addresses. 
Crucially, the relations within a machine are never fixed, they are always in a state of 
Becoming-. Understanding rape culture as machinic, we can see how women’s bodies are 
policed, produced and reproduced in public space. We can also imagine ethico-political 
alternatives to the anxiety and ‘truth’ of what this rape culture means and how it works.   
Certainly, the transformation of rape culture is no humble aim. If contemporary fear of 
crime studies wants to take seriously the effects of social injustice, spatial exclusion, and 
gender violence, we need ways in which to counter dominant thinking about women in 
public spaces. Recognising that rape culture exists – the context in which sexual violence 
against women is normalised – begins this work. Unlike what RAINN suggest, we cannot 
agree that the stranger-rapist is some ‘other guy’, or some ‘weirdo’ out there. We cannot 
accept that the myth of the stranger-rapist continues to construct public space and 
connect with other machines which produce fear of crime. We cannot accept this because 
we need to challenge the taken-for-grantedness of rape culture that enables it to thrive 
as part of State apparatus. Recognising the molecularity of myths as a counter to seeing 
the molarity of them as State apparatus is also part of this work.  It is no mean feat to 
transform a culture which condones violence against women, but it is the feat that 
feminists, criminologists and social scientist have been calling for, for decades. Kirsten 
Jozkowski (2015: 21) writing about transforming rape culture on US university campuses 
reminds us that culture can be changed. Indeed, she points out, this has worked when it 
comes to changing cultural attitudes to smoking and to drunk driving, for instance. The 
transformation of culture is therefore not impossible. Of course, crystallising education 
programmes or government policies as the tools through which rape culture might be 
countered opens up other apparatus of capture by the State (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b 
[1980]: 386)8. They, for instance, open up different ways in which to prefer certain bodies 
and exclude others, or to accept some forms of gender violence in certain circumstances.   
Yet, the war machine can transform the way we think about gender, public space, fear of 
crime, control… It is not simply about smashing the rape myths which compose rape 
culture into oblivion (although it might be), it is about interrogating them at a molecular 
level: interrogating how knowledge about sexual violence, fear of crime and public spaces 
is made, how rape culture practices are produced, and undoing the mystery about the 
stranger-rapist and his ubiquity, by recognising that in part, this mystery is an inherent 
part of the State apparatus.  
Post script 
I write this chapter at a time of potential political upheaval in the UK; debates from the 
political left and political right unfold, fold, entwine, metamorph into each other around 
the question of whether or not the UK should vote to leave the European Union (EU). In a 
recent press interview, Nigel Farage, the leader of the right-wing United Kingdom 
Independence Party and Member of the European Parliament lobbying for the UK to leave 
the EU recently warned voters that, following reported sex attacks on women in Cologne, 
Germany in early 2016, allegedly perpetrated by asylum-seekers, ‘women may be at a 
particular risk from the ‘cultural’ differences between British society and migrants’ (Ross, 
2016) if the UK remains in the EU.  Farage elides the body of the asylum-seeker (black, 
poor, Other) with that of the European migrant to promote fear of crime – fear of sexual 
violence here. Recall my earlier comments about ‘culture’: Farage’s comments suppose 
that British society is not a culture that rapes and that those Other, different, migrants are 
cultures that rape, which not only occludes British rape culture, but also relies on the 
truth of its existence, and on the position of the woman’s body as inherently vulnerable 
to stranger-rapists to make this political point.  Farage’s concern is not with women who 
are ‘at risk’, instead it is with using the body of the woman, which stands in for a threat to 
nationhood, and to security of the border, to work together as part of a State apparatus 
of control. These conjunctions demonstrate how rape culture is nurtured, and how it is 
mobilised to serve political imperatives of the State, even those which, on the face of it, 
have little to do with sexuality or gender equality. Comments like this remind us of the 
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1 I recognize that my ‘we’ may not be your ‘we’. The evidence presented in this chapter, and the socio-cultural 
context about which I am speaking, is situated in post-industrialist economies, usually situated in the global 
north. This is in part because this is where my empirical examples are drawn from and in part because this 
socio-economic context is often erroneously assumed to be more egalitarian in terms of gender relations than 
lower or middle income countries (but see for interesting discussions of this Khan et al., 2011). 
2 In this chapter, reference to the State follows Deleuze and Guattari (2004b [1980]), and is not the same as 
reference to a nation or a government, though these might also be part of State apparatus (see post-script). In 
this context, the State can be described as a normalizing force.  It represents hierarchical power, it can also 
appropriate and recapture (reterritorialise) revolutionary thought, war machines, the capacity to transform, 
and so on. It is, according to Deleuze and Guattari (2004b [1980]:480), the force through which capitalism 
‘triumphs’ in the ‘West’.  It harnesses potentiality and energy and through this, creates inequalities. 
3 Though my discussion in this chapter is about women, as these are the group that is targeted by the empirical 
evidence I draw on here, it is clear that non-normative performances of masculinity and trans* subjectivity are 
also out-of-place in many public spaces (though there exists little fear of crime research on this latter group 
yet) (but see for instance Otis, 2007, Moore and Breeze, 2012, Yavorsky and Sayer, 2013 Ableson, 2014).  
4  ‘Page 3’ is the name given to a specific cultural artefact in United Kingdom (UK) society. It describes the page 
of a popular daily tabloid newspaper which publishes a full page image of a young woman wearing only the 
lower part of her underwear, leaving her breasts exposed. 
5 The Greek system describes sorority or fraternity groups on US university campuses 
6 Becoming- appears in this form to remind of the fluid, contingent, imminent qualities of Becoming-; it is 
unfinished, it is in flux – running into the next idea, or body, or concept – the hyphen marks the 
incompleteness of Becoming- and the energy with which Becomings- flow.  
7 A ‘pale’ is a post or stake used to create a boundary around a specific territory or site.  That which is within 
the boundary marks what is safe, enclosed and secure.  When something is beyond the pale, it is not only 
‘other’ or alien but also indecent, abject or disgusting. There is an affective revulsion around being beyond the 
pale. The pale also denotes a defensible state or area. Between the 12th and 16th century, ‘pale’ described 
parts of Ireland under English rule. Being beyond this pale was being beyond the limits of English law and 
decency (OED, 2013). The stranger-rapist, the Other, the arsehole is equally abject and indecent.   
8 Compare O’Byrne et al.’s (2008) and Beres’s (2010) discussion of sexual miscommunication theory with the 
‘yes means yes’ campaigned described and critiqued by Jozkowski (2015) for an example of an attempt to 
transform rape culture which has been co-opted and transformed to further victimise women who experience 
sexual violence by hetero-patriarchal State apparatus (‘if a girl doesn’t say no…’, O’Bryne et al., 2008). 
                                                          
